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THE SOCIOLOGICAL ORGANIZATION,
MOTIVATIONS, AND VALUE SYSTEMS
OF THE ARMED FORCES

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NAVY GRADUATE COMPTROLLERSHIP PROGRAM

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THE SOCIOLOGICAL ORGANIZATION,
MOTIVATIONS, AND VALUE SYSTEMS
OF THE
ARMED FORCES

by

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" "
Major, USMC

Prepared for

DR. A. REX JOHNSON

May 1958

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PREFACE

This paper was prompted by the hearings, presently being conducted in our Halls of Congress, on how to provide the kinds of incentives and conditions needed for motivation and retention of sufficient numbers of officers and enlisted personnel required by our Armed Forces today and for the foreseeable future. This task of procuring and keeping up to strength a 3 million armed force of high quality during peacetime is a most difficult problem.

In Part One of this paper an attempt will be made to trace, in a general fashion, the progress of the United States' military man through history. This will be done in order to provide a background for analyzing the special characteristics of our present military organizations. In Part Two I will identify, define, and analyze these special characteristics which make these organizations unique in the contemporary society.

Prior to entering George Washington University, I completed a tour of duty in the Personnel Plans and Policy Branch of G-1, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters. Part of this tour was a year spent as a member of the staff of the Advisory Committee on Professional and Technical Compensation, commonly known as The Cordiner Committee.

Although a great deal of the information used in this

paper was received from the four Services and the Office of The Secretary of Defense, the views expressed herein may not reflect their opinions.

I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness for the help given by The Army Library and many kind people in the Department of Defense.

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PART ONE

CHAPTER I

EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

The military and naval organizations of the United States are modeled on systems adopted from the British at the time of the Revolutionary War. But, the idea of compensating military personnel in order to satisfy their material needs and not reward them for the job they do may be traced to the days of Plato. In the Republic, Plato has sketched an outline of the ideal state and in so doing indicated some very specific and detailed suggestions for the selection, training, and maintenance of the "Guardians of the State". Plato specified that the Guardians of the State were to have no private property, and that their minimal adequate material wants were to be wholly supplied by the State at Large.

As the probable prototype for Plato's conception, and as an extremely interesting case study, Sparta in the 7th to 5th Centuries B.C. is unique. Spartan discipline, courage, and simplicity are, of course, proverbial. The systems by which the Spartans developed these traits are filled with valuable historical lessons.

The officer corps of modern military groups is composed largely of full-time professional military leaders and the enlisted personnel represent a cross-section of the whole society. For several centuries prior to 1800 British armies were officered by "amateurs" drawn solely from the aristocracy.

In the British Military, officers came from the nobility and rank went with inherited wealth or title. The enlisted Red-coat was, by and large, an illiterate and generally drawn from only the very lowest classes of society. Gaps in the ranks were filled with conscripts combed from the overcrowded slums of London and Liverpool. Many of the Royal Navy's seamen were jailbirds and guttersnipes corralled by impressment or literally "shanghaied" from waterfront dives. Thus there yawned a vast gulf between the economic and cultural backgrounds of officer and enlisted personnel in the King's service. An almost impassable chasm lay between them. The man in the ranks, no matter what his ability, had no chance at all of rising above the grade of sergeant.¹

While the men were clothed and fed by the "King", officers purchased their own uniforms and supplied their own mess. The wealthy often maintained a considerable establishment, even in the field. Witness Gentleman General Burgoyne marching to Saratoga with a lavish retinue of servants, wine stewards, cooks and lackeys. Officer pay was low - it was assumed he was something of a sportsman who served for honor, fame, and adventure.

A chance for fortune entered the compensation scheme - prize money for Naval personnel and loot for the Army. Officers and men alike might share in rich cargo hauls or the pillage of a conquered territory.

Fortescue points out that the officers purchased their

¹Robert Galbin, Introduction to Military History, (New York and London; D. Appleton Century Co., 1929,) p. 160.

commissions and then they set about recruiting a body of men for the army. The objective was plunder; therefore, the pay of officers and men could be considered a sort of retainer, or interest upon an investment, to tide them over until such time as booty could be had.¹

Thus the Continental system was based on the philosophy of "minimal needs"; rates of cash pay for servicemen were set low. The troops were furnished quarters on the post or aboard ship and enlisted men were provided with rations, while it was assumed that officers were gentlemen who could presumably afford to stock their own mess.

Chances for prize money or loot were included in the compensation scheme (and remained in it for many years).

One of the first resolutions of the First Continental Congress, which was passed on June 14, 1775, provided for the raising of several companies of infantry. The language stated that each man was to find his own "clothes and arms". The terms of enlistment was one year and the monthly rates of pay were:

Captain	\$20.00	Sergeant	\$8.00
Lt.	\$13.33	Corporal	\$7.33
		Private	\$6.66 ²

On the next day, June 15, 1775, a resolution to appoint a general was passed. The pay of the general was fixed at five hundred dollars per month.³ The following day another resolution

¹The Hon. J. W. Fortescue, The British Army 1783-1902, (London: McMillan and Co., 1905), p.6.

²Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1905), Foreward to Vol. 1.

³Ibid, p. 91.

provided for the appointment of two major generals with pay of one-hundred sixty-six dollars per month.

On June 18, 1775, John Adams wrote to Elbridge Gerry -

The pay which has been voted to all the officers, which the Continental Congress intends to choose, is so large, that I fear our people will think it extravagant, and be uneasy. Mr. Adams, Mr. Paine, and myself used our utmost endeavors to reduce it, but in vain.

Those ideas of equality, which are so agreeable to us natives of New England, are very disagreeable to many gentlemen in the other colonies. They had a great opinion of the high importance of a continental general, and were determined to place him in an elevated point of light. They think the Massachusetts establishment too high for the privates, and too low for the officers, and they would have it their own way.¹

There may have been some personal animosity in Adams' argument, for one of his biographers says that he made one dreadful mistake; he was largely responsible for the policy of ignoring the just rights and decent dignity of the military commanders which lost the country some of its best officers, and led ultimately to Arnold's treason.²

As shown above, the officer rates corresponded roughly to the British, and the enlisted pay was just a little better. But Continental pay was considerably below par when it came to current civilian earnings and to the pay offered the militia of the several states.

As the war progressed, inflation set in, prices on the market climbed while the value of the dollar declined. Civilian pays were increased while the troops, at times, did not receive

¹The Works of John Adams, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1854), Vol. 9, p. 358.

²Forrest Korgan, "John Adams", Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. I, pp. 121-122.

its pay, clothing and rations. The Connecticut regiments mutinied because of starvation. The Pennsylvania line mutinied at Morristown, and elements marched toward Philadelphia to obtain redress for clothing, bounties, and pay due them but not received. New Jersey troops also mutinied for similar cause.

Their revolt was against unbearable conditions and contained many of the elements of lawful revolution to justify it on the ground that the Government had failed totally in its duty to its defenders.¹

American soldiers were expected to share in plunder, as evidenced by Article 12 of the "Rules and Regulations" of the Continental Army which read -

If any officer or soldier, shall leave his post or colors in time of an engagement, to go in search of plunder he shall, if a commissioned officer, be cashiered, and drummed out of the army with infamy, and forfeit all share of plunder; if a non-commissioned officer or soldier, be whipped, not less than twenty, nor more than thirty-nine lashes, according to the nature of the offence, and forfeit all share of the plunder taken from the enemy.²

But the Continentals didn't gain in this type compensation because they could not pillage their own countryside and looting violated the innate Yankee respect for private property. However, the Continental warships did capture some prize hauls - one bonanza netted a Navy crew over a million dollars. But the big hauls usually went to civilian privateers (armed vessels authorized to raid enemy shipping). When John Rathburn's Continental squadron put into Charleston after its second war cruise, nearly every man quit naval service to sail with civilian

¹Frederic L. Huidekoper, The Military Unpreparedness of the United States, (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1915), footnote Journal of the Continental Congress, III, 333.

privateers which promised more lucrative pay-offs.

The Continental recruiting and retainment problem worsened steadily as the war went on. Some historians attribute this to the steady procession of frustrations and defeats suffered by Washington's army - the Revolutionaries seemed to be fighting a losing war. But the troops won some great victories at Princeton and Saratoga; yet enlistments steadily declined.

Company after company of Yankees served a short term and went home. One reason was the gross disparity between servicemen's pay and civilian income. The volunteers wanted to know why the civilian blacksmith, tinker or waggoner should make twice the wage of his counterpart in uniform. It was realized that civilian economy supported the war effort and gunsmiths were needed to make guns but the pay differential between gunsmith and gunner proved hard for the latter to swallow.

The American volunteer did not demand luxuries nor did he expect comforts. But he refused to serve for nothing (or next to nothing) in a land of respectable incomes and abundance. That was why there were only 2,500 Continentals remaining after Valley Forge. Most of those who deserted or left after short-term enlistments did so on account of pay. The writings of George Washington contain many bitter references to the subject. Late in 1778 Washington wrote:

Our money is now sinking fifty per cent a day while a great part of the officers of our army from absolute necessity are quitting the Service, and the

more virtuous few, rather than do this are sinking by
sure degrees into beggary and want.¹

¹John C. Fitzpatrick (ed.), The Writings of George Washington, (Washington, D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1931), V, 200.

CHAPTER II

COMPENSATION BY PRESTIGE, BONUS AND BOUNTY

It seems probable the American Army would have gone out of existence at Valley Forge had it not been for two great leaders, Washington, the Commander in Chief, and General Baron von Steuben.

Von Steuben was a genuine soldier who had served as a Prussian officer since early youth. However, unlike other Prussians of privileged birth, he had entered the service as a private and passed through all the ranks in order to learn from the bottom up. Again unlike his Prussian colleagues, Von Steuben had conceived a humane regard for the common foot soldier. As aide to Frederick the Great he had reorganized the Prussian Army. He insisted that officers must achieve competence through training and enlisted men were not to be treated as mere "cannon fodder".

Congress made Von Steuben inspector general of the Continental Army. He arrived at Valley Forge as a Godsend to Washington. His first move was to introduce an efficient manual of arms and a new program of drills - a kind to encourage teamwork and revitalize the tone of the infantry. Von Steuben believed in leading men rather than driving them which was a new concept in those days.

To quote Vagts:

He (Steuben) made the officers undergo the gymnastics of the Prussian cadet so that they could instruct their men. With this teaching went the minimum of discipline that served the purpose of the American Army, instead of the Prussian Maximum which underwent a considerable humanitization on the way across the Atlantic. Steuben remembered too well the abuses which the men in Europe suffered at the hands of their officers.¹

From Colonel William A. Ganoe's The History of the United States Army we learn that Steuben introduced the first standard set of regulations in the Service. In these it was expressly stated that "the first object" of the officer was "to gain the love of his men by treating them with every possible kindness and humanity".²

To engender morale, Von Steuben sponsored several notable innovations. He set out to establish pride in Service and what we call today "pride in regiment". The prestige of officers and men alike must be cultivated; this could partly compensate them for inadequate pay. But first the men must take pride in themselves; if treated like lowly inferiors they would have no personal pride. Vagts says:

The considerate treatment of the common soldier finally led to the beginnings of mass honor a revolutionary idea. To the American soldier was given a share of the general honors and distinctions gained in war by the introduction of so-called service stripes - insignia connoting three years' service with bravery, fidelity and good conduct.³

¹Alfred Vagts, The History of Militarism (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1937), p. 103.

²Col. William A. Ganoe, The History of the United States Army, (New York: D. Appleton Century Co., 1942), p. 12.

³Vagts, op. cit., p. 104.

Moreover, Von Steuben did not forget the economy in the Prussian Army which strictly forbade the use of enlisted men as officers' servants, a habit rapidly developed in the American Army. He had the servants returned to their original duty.

However, all of Von Steuben's efforts, and he devoted his personal fortune to the Revolution, were unable to rectify the pay situation. Troops were asked to accept paper money which declined in buying power before they could spend it.

Congress made belated efforts to adjust it and finally hit upon the idea of land bounties. America was vastly rich in real estate so why not pay off the servicemen in land? A dual purpose motivated this device: award the man for his service, and encourage the settlement of unpopulated territories. A 100 acres were offered for long-term enlistees. Then 300 acres, and before the war's end bounties for officer's and men went as high as 3,000 acres.

But acres of wilderness could not be used to pay a cobbler's bill. Officers and men who owed any kind of a bill became desperate. In those days a man could go to jail for debt, so the serviceman who survived the Revolution faced not only poverty but debtor's prison.

After the pay revolts of the Pennsylvania Line and the New Jersey Line, the soldiers were denounced as "money hungry". People who had never served an hour in the field stood up to chide Army officers for being "mercenary". It was said the Army was infected with "Commercialism" and the spirit of Benedict Arnold.

The Army could not have moved at all had not the French agreed to let Lafayette purchase shoes for Washington's advance regiments.

Under Washington, Lafayette and Von Steuben the troops went on down to Yorktown. Many of our American histories tell us we won the Revolution at Yorktown. But Canoe tells it a little differently.

Yorktown capitulated without more glory to our Army than that the siege was conceived by Washington and aided by American troops. Had not the French outfitted them.... it is doubtful if they could have been present at the capture, except in the nude. Had not the French had an overwhelming amount of men and materials, it is certain Yorktown could not have been captured.¹

As the war drew to a close, the half pay promised the officers was never produced. They had not received one-sixth of their pay during the Revolution and were often so humiliated on social occasions they would not attempt to invite foreign officers or associates to a meal. Their private resources were at an end and their friends (the French) were wearied out and disgusted with their repeated appeals.

Finally the Army did melt away - little by little - officers resigning; men simply wandering off. Nobody made a real effort to stop them. At one post after another the soldiers drifted over the hill. By the time peace was signed in 1783 less than 700 Continentals were on duty.

As shall be later seen, this attitude of Congress and the people is not going to be confined to Revolutionary days.

There were a great many imperfections in the Continental

¹Canoe, op. cit., p. 96.

military compensation system. Washington observed one weakness in the systems' rationale which struck him as worthy of note.

He wrote:

Men may speculate as they will; they may talk of patriotism; they may draw a few examples from ancient stories of great achievements performed by its influence... I know patriotism exists...but I will venture to assert that it must be aided by a prospect of interest or some reward.¹

A final observation from Washington's pen on the subject of military pay. To begin with, a word from Vagts: "He (Washington) realized that an expert had to be well paid if he was to remain in the service - the service which the best of officers often threatened to quit unless better provided for."²

The quote from Washington comes from his published Writings:

This (higher pay) will induce gentlemen and men of character to engage They ought to have such allowances as will enable them to live like and support the character of gentlemen, and not be driven by a scanty pittance to the low and dirty arts of filching from the public more than the difference of pay would amount to upon an ample allowance There is nothing that gives a man consequence and renders him independent of everybody but the country he serves If such pay will be allowed officers and proper care and precaution are used in the nomination, more regard being to the character of persons than to the number of men we can enlist, we should be in a little time have an army able to cope with any that can be opposed to it.³

¹John C. Fitzpatrick (ed.), The Writings of George Washington, (Washington, D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1931), II, 28.

²Vagts, op. cit., p. 103.

³Fitzpatrick (ed.), Op. cit., IV, 112-131

CHAPTER III

FROM FEDERAL PERIOD TO CIVIL WAR

As Vagts points out in A History of Militarism: "The curious thing about the chief military lessons to be drawn from the War of Independence is that they were little heeded in the War of 1812."¹

The results of this failure to heed were to be made apparent by America's military breakdown in the War of 1812.

"To be prepared for war is one of the most effective means for preserving peace," Washington had said.²

But Army enlistments bogged down and national leaders did not take alarm until late in 1811 when war with Britain came closer. Congress voted to offer a cash bonus of \$16 to any recruit who would sign up for five years, plus three months' pay (\$5) upon honorable discharge, plus 160 acres of bounty land. But there were no recruits to be had at these prices.

The Army, in the War of 1812, gave the worst performance in its history. Opposition to British counter-invasion was a series of blundering retreats. Undisciplined soldiers took to their heels. Colby points out: "The Army had played its part in burlesque and tragedy. It had been more pitiful than in the

¹Vagts, op. cit., p. 201.

²Fitzpatrick (ed.), op. cit., IV, 311.

Revolution."¹

Theodore Roosevelt explains these happenings when he said:

Our people, during the twelve years before the War of 1812, refused to make any preparations whatever. They saved a million or two dollars by so doing; and in mere money paid a hundred fold for each million thus saved during the three years of war which followed.²

Stretching the Pay Dollar (1820-1845)

Fifteen years after the War of 1812 the Army secured its first peacetime pay raise - extra pay of \$10 a month and one ration to the captain actively in charge of a company.

Ganoe explains:

The purpose was to alleviate the distress of junior officers who had difficulty in living on their pay Sometimes, naturally, good captains were detached in order to give the increased pay to straitened Lieutenants. In any case, only a few could receive the small benefit of the law. Instead of giving a substantial increase to every soldier, (the lawmakers) resorted to a petty compromise which caused discrimination, did not raise the general morale, and was on the whole wasteful.³

It was just about this time that Thayer cast the mold for West Point that made it what it is today. He introduced new instruction methods - weekly standing reports, the scale of daily marks, the blackboard system, and class rank according to scholarship. One of his innovations was the honor system. The West Point motto also was born during Thayer: "Duty, Honor, Country".

¹Elbridge Colby, American Militarism, (Washington: Society of American Engineers, 1934), p. 32.

²Ibid, p. 32

³Ganoe, op. cit., p. 289.

After the Mexican War Congress saw that the war proved the merits of the Military Academy. Several minor acts showed the confidence of the legislative body in the institution. The professors of engineering, philosophy, mathematics, ethics and chemistry were given a flat rate of pay of \$2,000 and the professors of drawing and French each \$1,500. The Superintendent was to receive no less than the highest paid professor.

Congress, for the first time, recognized foreign service in its pay provisions. Those officers serving in the far countries of Oregon and California were to receive \$2 a day extra and the enlisted men were to have their pay doubled.

In 1854 Congress raised the pay of the enlisted man by \$4 a month. In addition, it gave its first recognition to pay for length of service. The soldier's second enlistment gave him an increase of \$2 a month over his regular pay and each successive enlistment for five years \$1.

These measures of the 1850's were important only as precedents. Otherwise, the pay adjustments were too meager to have more than a momentary effect. In no sense could they have been called "peace-time raises".

In 1850 the nation was booming with one word - "Gold!". Gold was discovered on Sutter's ranch and the whole world turned its attention toward El Dorado. The gold rush boomed in the East as well as in the West. Production couldn't keep up with the demand for goods, as wages increased so did prices. The effect on fixed army incomes is obvious.¹

¹F. L. Paxson, History of the American Frontier, 1763-1893, (Cambridge, Mass.: The Riverside Press, 1924), p. 103.

As though by the quirk of a boomerang the troops who had won the West for America ended up with least in return. The officer could just about get by if he lived in a desert fort and ate buffalo meat. The Forty-Niner could make \$200 a month and a San Francisco carpenter could demand approximately \$400 while the poor private received a basic \$12 in Fort Laramie, or even \$24 in California with "foreign service pay".

Ganoe says, "When gold was discovered in California, soldiers deserted for the El Dorado by the wholesale. Captains in the West found themselves in some cases without a single soldier in their companies. The small army became still smaller every day."¹

Officers, too, quit the service to make a better living out of uniform. Among those to go were: General John C. Fremont (who promptly made a fortune in the Gold Field), and West Pointers Jefferson Davis (to resume a career in politics), Braxton Bragg (to run a plantation), Jubal Early (to practice law), Thomas Johnathan Jackson (to teach), William Tecumseh Sherman (to become a banker in San Francisco), and Ulysses S. Grant.

Grant was in Oregon Territory when he resigned his commission. In his memoirs he says, "Prices for all kinds of supplies were so high on the Pacific Coast that it would have been impossible for officers of the Army to exist on their pay, if authority had not been given them to purchase commissary supplies at New Orleans' wholesale prices."²

¹Ganoe, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

²U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, (New York: Charles L. Webster & Co., 1885), I, 202.

Grant and his fellow officers raised their vegetables to make ends meet. They also performed many of the "house-keeping" duties on the short-handed post. Grant's account concludes:

A cook could be hired for the pay of captain. The cook could do better My family all this while was in the East. It consisted now of a wife and two children. I saw no chance of supporting them out of my pay as an Army Officer. I concluded, therefore, to resign.¹

So closed the scene of action just prior to the Civil War. The military had made possible the acquisition of a third of the present United States. It had also made the territories capable for occupancy. It built roads, protected the mails, opened river routes, kept the Indians down, and helped spread the railroads from one coast of the United States to the other.

Civil War

The war came, and the law and custom of the Constitution depended upon the armed forces of the land for their protection. In February 1861, the regular army which we had available numbered only about 16,000 men, without experience in operations or maneuvers.

General Scott, then head of the Army, recommended the calling of 300,000 troops for three years, while McClellan wanted a stronger force to stay in the field indefinitely. Because of political reasons, Lincoln on April 15, 1861, called for 75,000 volunteers for just three-month tours of duty.

Colby says, "It was a patch work crazy-quilt of an army

¹Ibid, p. 210

that moved forward July 16, (1861) in response to the general demand "On to Richmond" with kilted troops, and red breeches, and some uniformed groups looking more like delegations at a firemen's convention than like soldiers."¹

Because the Union depended mainly upon hastily raised and improvised raw troops the battle of Bull Run was lost to other hastily raised and improvised raw troops who could have been overcome in short order by efficient forces. Because the battle of Bull Run was lost, the war dragged and used up the manpower of the country.

The three-month volunteers who had finished their tour would put their arms aside and go home in the middle of a battle situation. Something had to be done. Hasty repairs had to be made in order to build an army and navy. One step in this direction was the introduction of a new Navy pay bill in 1861. The increase in pay was not great. Commanders pay ranged from \$2,250 to \$3,150, based on sea duty and five year increments of service. Lieutenants commanding at sea moved up to \$2,250. Lieutenants (not commanding) received \$1,500 for sea duty and their pay scaled up to \$2,250 for 13 years of service. This is the first sign of longevity pay in a definite form.

A few months later a new bill was passed and four new ranks were introduced: Rear Admiral, Lieutenant Commander, and Ensign. Ensigns were paid \$1,200 for sea duty and \$960 for shore duty. Commanders and Lieutenants received a cut of several hundred dollars. Captains also took a cut from \$4,200 to \$3,500

¹Colby, op. cit., p. 41.

for sea duty and from \$3,600 to \$2,800 for shore. Rear Admirals were paid \$5,000 for sea and \$4,600 for shore duties.

Enlisted men's pay ranged from \$12 a month for a landsman to \$18 a month for a seaman. It is interesting to note all enlisted received \$1.50 a month extra for grog money. Petty officer pay ranged from \$20 to \$45 a month.

Once again we find the military pay rates frozen while civilian wages increased with the spiral of prices climbing up and up. The Navy pay had to be supplemented, so Congress brought back the business of compensation by prize money and bounty awards.

It was just about this time history witnesses many changes in the Army after Bull Run. Congress passed an Act authorizing the Army to accept 50,000 volunteers for 6 months to 3 year enlistments. Another 50,000 could be enlisted for war duration. Congress no sooner authorized Lincoln to raise a one-million man army when they voted a rider providing that the military forces be reduced to 25,000 at war's end.

Congress passed other legislation which provided for:

1. The abolishment of flogging the men in the United States Service.
2. The changing of the West Point oath - the cadet must swear to support the Constitution.
3. The regulation that no officer could quit his post by merely resigning.
4. An Army Retirement Board, similar to the newly formed Navy Board, to break the seniority blockage and relieve

the aged or incapacitated of duty.

Congress passed some good legislation as evidenced above but they also committed several serious errors in the flurry. State troopers were permitted to elect their own officers, thereby putting popularity ahead of competence. The Congress did nothing about Army pay. Officer pay remained at pre-war rates while the pay of the private was raised from \$11 to \$13 per month. This additional \$2 was retained until the man's enlistment expired in order to insure good conduct. The volunteer who furnished his own uniform was allowed \$3.50, and 40 cents a day was paid to the volunteer cavalryman who furnished his own mount and equipment. It was also prescribed that the War Secretary devise a system whereby the soldier's family might draw some of his pay. Enlistment bonuses went as high as \$1,500 in some states, while the man who volunteered early in the war received little or no bonus for enlisting.

It must be remembered that the serviceman's pay was in greenbacks and like the Continental dollar of the Revolution, the greenback was soon devaluated by war inflation. It was worth about 97 cents when first issued but dropped to 35 cents by 1864.

While the gross compensation of the military man ranged from \$427 to \$1,192 per year, civilian fortunes were garnered by armament makers and dealers in war materials. Large sums were also banked by many small manufacturers who produced supplies for home consumption. To quote Faulkner and Kepner:

The war developed a group of newly rich. Millionaires increased from a handful in 1860 to hundreds. With the

unprecedented prosperity came extravagance and the pursuit of pleasure. Theaters were crowded, huge stakes were offered at the races, sports were liberally supported. Expensive jewelry, clothing, and furniture found a ready sale. This high living was largely confined to a certain class....¹

Yet with all the money-making going on in Northern cities, with civilian business bulging at the pockets, the soldiers were accused of being "morcenary" when they demanded bigger bonuses or higher pay.

The Confederate Army was having similar problems. A letter of General Lee's contains this comment: "Our people have not been earnest enough, have thought too much of themselves and their ease, and instead of turning out to a man, have been content to nurse themselves and their dimes."²

After the war, the British biographer of Stonewall Jackson remarked that had the United States, early in 1861 been able to put into the field, in addition to their volunteers, one army corps of regular troops the war would have ended in a few months. An enormous expenditure of life and money would thus have been avoided.

¹Harold Underwood Faulkner and Tyler Kepner, America: Its History and People, (Reprinted for The United States Armed Forces Institute by McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1950), p. 270.

²Ganoe, op. cit., p. 182.

CHAPTER IV

THE SPANISH WAR

The 1870 Navy pay grades remained unchanged throughout the 80's and most of the 90's. Service pay was bettered a little by the introduction in 1876 of an 8 cent per mile travel allowance. About the same time a provision went into effect offering 75 per cent of sea pay for retirement after 40-45 years service. The only catch to this inducement was that it held out little promise to the junior officer or enlisted man who never expected to reach the age of 60.

In 1881 General Sherman started a move to raise the intellectual level of the officer corps by founding the School of Applications for infantry and cavalry at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This was the beginning of the Army's general and special service schools. The program included two courses. First year: correct reading, legible handwriting, grammar, mathematics, and history. Second year: military law, theory, science, and art of warfare.

In 1887 the Cavalry School at Fort Riley was established. Appropriations were not to be had for the two Service schools; they were paid for out of the Army's budget - scratch as scratch can.

Little was done to better the enlisted man's lot in the

80's, meaning that personnel policies remained more or less at a standstill. Perhaps little could be done to improve the quality of the type of men who would enlist in a service paying \$16 a month. However, the Army like the Navy of this period was overloaded with patriarchal enlisted men, old-timers who had been in so long they had forgotten their right names.

Economics of a negative sort aided the American soldier of the 1890's. A depression during Cleveland's second term lowered wages on the domestic front and brought military pay more in line with civilian earnings. The depression served also to swell the available manpower pool and spur military recruiting.

In 1890 the promotion structure was revised, and some of the stagnation was "bled off" as a number of older officers retired. But soldiering was no holiday with the Sioux on the warpath.

At the start of the Spanish American War in April 1898, U.S. Army numbered about 28,747 men. This force was committed to do battle on foreign soil against the Spanish Army forces totaling approximately 200,000.

With the nation population at 73,000,000 the Army rolls carried only 25,000 effective regulars. Ganoe describes the Army's muster roll as:

The smallest proportional regular force (since) the revolution....Congress for nearly 30 years had almost totally confined itself to ignoring or paring and cutting land forces while the territory of the country was expanding....There were no adequate staff departments and no general staff. Though the War with Spain had been foreseen

It is not an exaggeration to say that the most serious and
 the most difficult of the problems which the Government has
 to face is the problem of the future of the country. The
 Government has to decide whether it is to continue to
 rule the country as it has been ruled for the last
 hundred years, or whether it is to make a new
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for some time, nothing had been done to change our ludicrous defensive weakness, let alone our offensive capacity. Even the militias of the various states as a whole had little understanding and less practical knowledge of conduct of war....The situation of the United States would have been comic had it not turned out to be tragic.¹

On April 26, 1898,² an Act provided that in time of war the pay of the enlisted men would be increased by twenty per cent. "This wise step obviated the use of bounties."³ But, when the Spanish American War ended, the pay rates for enlisted men reverted to those of 1872.

Up until 1899 the Navy and Army had different rates of pay, but the Act of March 3, 1899, made the pay scale for line officers of the Army and Navy identical.

¹Ganoe, op. cit., p. 348.

²United States at Large, XXX, 365.

³Huidekoper, op. cit., p. 163.

The first thing I noticed when I stepped out of the car was the smell of the sea. It was a salty, fresh scent that I had never experienced before. The sun was shining brightly, and the waves were crashing against the shore. I felt a sense of freedom and adventure as I walked along the beach.

The beach was wide and sandy, with a few people scattered in the distance. I walked for a while, feeling the sand under my feet and the breeze on my face. The sound of the waves was soothing and calming. I had heard that the beach was beautiful, and now I knew it was true. The water was clear and blue, and the sky was a perfect shade of blue. I felt like I had found a hidden gem.

I walked along the shore, watching the waves roll in. The sun was low in the sky, and the light was golden. I felt a sense of peace and tranquility. The beach was perfect for a day of relaxation. I had heard that the beach was beautiful, and now I knew it was true. The water was clear and blue, and the sky was a perfect shade of blue. I felt like I had found a hidden gem.

CHAPTER V

COMPENSATION FROM 1900 to 1958

The Army's Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 1909¹ carried the most important pay action since 1775. The new pay scale was brought about by arguments presented in a report by the Secretary of War for the year 1907.² This report appears to be the first critical analysis of U.S. military pay system.

The arguments contained in the report of the Secretary of War were essentially these: Since the last setting of military wages, conditions in the military service, as well as conditions in industry had changed. Opportunities outside have vastly increased, while the inducements to enter the Army have remained the same or relatively lessened. The results were seen in the fact that recruiting agencies had not been able to keep the Army up to strength since 1904.

It was also pointed out that applications for original enlistment and reenlistment were declining, desertions were increasing, and resignations of officers were also increasing.

Some of the remedies proposed by the Secretary of War to overcome the above situation were:

1. Increased pay.

¹United States Statutes at Large, XXXV, 108.

²Senate Report No. 155, 60th Congress, 1st Session, Vol.1.

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2. Increased allowance for clothing, rations and quarters.

3. Increased promotional opportunities for enlisted men. It was suggested that the rank of Warrant Officer be established to provide for the further advancement of skilled enlisted men. (The Congress did not establish the rank until the Act of June 10, 1922.)

4. Increase the prestige of N.C.O.'s. Permit NCO's to be married and provide quarters for them and their dependents.

The pay increases which were provided by the Congress via the Act of May 11, 1908 were not identical with those recommendations of the Secretary. The principles of high increases for the second and third enlistments allowed by lower increases in succeeding enlistments up to the seventh was followed for the privates. However, straight line increases for the noncommissioned officers up to the seventh enlistment, were granted.

The House did not ask for any increase for officers when it submitted its recommendations. The Senate's Committee on Military Affairs recommended increases for all ranks as follows:

Lieutenant General	10%
Major General and Brig. General	15%
Col., Lt. Col., and Major	20%
Capt., First Lt., and 2nd Lt.	25%
Enlisted (increases not to exceed 40% to be set by the President) ¹	

¹Congressional Record, 60th Congress, 1st Session, p. 2882.

It was argued that it was the duty of Congress to set the pay and not the President. Therefore, all enlisted pay was itemized.

In subsequent action on the bill, the increases for the officers were reduced so that the Lt. General received no increase, and Maj. General received 10%. The decrease for the top ranks came about because the Senators felt that the Generals should not make more than a Senator or a Representative.

In the new Act the principle of pay for responsibility alone was the guiding factor. It was not possible for any member to get as much as the highest pay of the next rank, and thus the higher pay for the higher responsibility principle was preserved. At the same time it provided a large enough pay range at any certain level to encourage a person to grow to full efficiency. When the point of full worth was achieved there were no further increases in pay.

There was a provision in this same Act which introduced the six month death gratuity payment for officers. This payment was computed on the basis of six months basic pay. It was felt that the officer's pay was so small that they were leaving no estates upon death. In prior years many of the officers' widows and children were left in the direst straits. One Senator pointed out that the widows of Senators and Representatives were provided with one year's pay under the Customs of the Congress that prevailed at that time. Another Senator argued that the widows and orphans of married enlisted men were left in no less dire straits and that this provision should be

intended to cover them.¹ In the end the law did provide for enlisted men as well as for the officers.


From 1908 to 1948 there were three major changes in the military pay scales for officers and four changes affecting enlisted personnel. Altogether, during this period about a dozen revisions were enacted, including percentage decreases during the depression years. The basic principles of the scale developed in 1908 were retained throughout the last 50 years despite an attempt in 1922 to arrive at logical differences between grades and to correlate military with civilian pay for comparable responsibility. As of the end of World War II, therefore, the scale approved in 1946 contained many of the fundamental inequities found in today's pay scales.

This Act of June 29, 1946, gave officers as a group their first increase since 1908. This percentage increase over 1942 averaged about 12 per cent for officers. The higher grades in the enlisted structure received a 15 to 20 per cent increase which further exaggerated the trend favoring enlisted personnel. Figure 1 shows the preferred treatment of enlisted personnel over officers since 1908.

¹Congressional Record, 60th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 2968-2970.

COMPRESSION OF MILITARY COMPENSATION*

1908 TO DATE



* Reflects 1955 Career Incentive Act Increases

Figure 1



CHAPTER VI

FRINGE BENEFITS SINCE 1929

Military personnel had the most liberal fringe benefits in 1929, with an annual per capita cost to the Government of \$473. Federal civilian employees were second with \$210, consisting mostly of annual leave and sick leave pay. In 1955-56, however, the Federal civilian employees were slightly higher than military personnel with \$987 as compared with \$918. This reversal of positions is the result of the amendments to the Civil Service Retirement Act in 1956; before these amendments the civilian personnel costs were lower.

The term "fringe benefits" includes vacation pay, sick leave, paid holidays, retirement benefits, survivor benefits, medical care, and other items paid for by the employer and intended to benefit the employee as a person.

As can be seen by the following table there has been a remarkable growth of fringe benefits since 1929. The table shows the average annual cost to the employer of fringe benefits per employee in 1929 and in 1955-1956, for several groups.

	<u>1929</u>	<u>1955-1956</u>
Wage and Salary Workers in private employment	\$38	\$632
Hourly workers in large companies	35	820
Military personnel	473	968
Federal Civilian Personnel	210	987

THE

AMERICAN

REVIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF THE NATION

IN THE YEAR 1850. BY JAMES M. COOPER, ESQ. OF NEW-YORK. VOL. I. NEW-YORK: PUBLISHED BY J. B. ALLEN, 151 NASSAU ST. 1850.

THE AMERICAN REVIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF THE NATION, FOR THE YEAR 1850, IS A WORK OF THE MOST INTERESTING AND IMPORTANT CHARACTER. IT CONTAINS A FULL AND COMPLETE HISTORY OF THE NATION, FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE PRESENT CENTURY TO THE PRESENT TIME. IT IS A WORK OF THE MOST INTERESTING AND IMPORTANT CHARACTER. IT CONTAINS A FULL AND COMPLETE HISTORY OF THE NATION, FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE PRESENT CENTURY TO THE PRESENT TIME.

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The averages for wage and salary workers in private employment include all such workers, even though some of them had no fringe benefits. The preceding table also shows that the per capita cost for hourly workers with large companies increased from \$35 in 1929 to \$820 in 1955. This category of workers has very nearly caught up with military and federal civilian personnel. About 26 per cent of the large employers in 1955 provided fringe benefits for their hourly workers that cost more than the military or federal civilian benefits. Comparable figures for officials and salaried workers in large companies are not available to me, but they probably would be higher.

As stated above, the fringe benefits include vacation, holiday and sick pay. The average person thinks of these things as "pay" rather than as fringe benefits. Consequently, the fringe benefits costs cannot be added to what the average person regards as "pay" as this would have the effect of adding the vacation, holiday and sick pay in twice.

There were distinct attractions in the military career prior to World War II because of these benefits but the situation is now reversed because of the significant movement in industry toward "non wage benefits" as a part of the workers compensation. An analysis of the trend during the last decade proves most enlightening.

Economists estimate that so-called "fringe benefits" have tripled in industry in the last 10 years and now cost employers at least 20% of their payrolls. This has occurred

during a period (1939-1951) when civilian wages in the lowest pay groups have tripled and salaries in the higher brackets have doubled.

Many companies today offer their employees free benefits of a wide variety in addition to their normal compensation. Most others offer subsidized contributory plans. One cause of this progressive trend, of course, is the high rate of tax on cash income. However, this change is attributed generally to an increasing awareness on the part of employers that those additive emoluments are necessary to satisfy the human desires of people in our growing economy. This is evidenced by the increasing emphasis on supplementary or non-wage benefits in labor-management negotiations.

A recent survey of "Personnel Practices in Factory and Office" conducted by the National Industrial Conference Board, and covering some 500 large companies gives the most up-to-date account of the additive, non-wage benefits offered by industry. A selection from this study of those practices most closely related to the pertinent questions is tabulated on page 33, showing the benefits and the percentage of companies offering them on a contributor or free basis.

My purpose in researching the study was to show that it is no longer true that supplementary benefits authorized for military personnel under present law are greatly superior, both in variety and substance, to those available to workers in industry. It is true that military benefits generally were broader and more advantageous in years gone by (prior to World

War II). The historical purpose of these traditional benefits was to give recognition to the inherent sacrifices of military life and to attract and hold qualified personnel in the armed services.

<u>Benefit</u>	<u>% of Companies Offering Benefit & Paying All or Part of Cost</u>	<u>% of These Companies That Pay all Costs</u>
Group Life Insurance	89.5	41.8
Hospital Insurance	98.4	35.3
Maternity Benefits	78.5	18.1
Retirement Pensions	66.2	65.2
Special Price on Co. Prod.	46.2	--
Subsidized Cafeteria	42.6	--
Free Periodic Med. Exam.	37.2	37.2
Year-end or Christmas Bonus	34.0	34.0
Paid Sick Leave	13.5	13.5

An analysis of some recent research on factors affecting attitudes and decisions of officer and enlisted personnel toward a military career reveal that the reason most give for remaining in the service is the retirement compensation. Among all of the military services there was a very wide measure of agreement that the present retirement program is one of the strongest inducements for career enlisted personnel to reenlist. Army and Air Force symposia reports most explicitly stated the general belief that pay and job satisfaction are much more important than retirement considerations to the first term enlisted man, but that somewhere in the six to nine year range of service, retirement becomes a dominant factor in the decision to reenlist.

Now let us look at the trend in industry as reported by the Department of Labor Bulletin #1187. The reports show

that approximately 7 million workers under collective bargaining agreements were covered by some form of pension plan in 1954, a 40% increase over 1950. It is most significant to note that nearly 85% of the workers covered by pension plans received these benefits on a non-contributory basis (as compared with approximately 75% in 1950). Benefits under many of these plans have been increased, with disability features added in a number of cases. Another development in the pension field which is of particular note is the trend with respect to "offsetting" Social Security payments. Because of increases in Social Security old age benefits through the years, and in order to preclude gains to the companies from these increases, there has been a definite swing away from "offsets." Many companies have in recent years fixed their pension programs so that any benefits from increases in Social Security accrue directly to the employee. An excerpt from the Labor Department report, which traces this development in more detail is quoted herewith:

A development in the pension plan field which has received considerable attention since 1950 concerns the integration or coordination of private plans with the Federal social security program. A considerable number of plans negotiated or revised through collective bargaining have provided in their benefit formulas for "offsetting" social security payments. Because total benefit levels were fixed under many of these programs, the statutory increases in social security payments in 1950 and 1954 resulted in decreases in the amounts to be paid from the private plans and thus did not increase the individual's total retirement income. In many such cases, management voluntarily or in agreement with unions amended the programs so as to pass on all or part of the social security increase to the worker. In integrated programs where no changes were made for the duration of the pension agreement, many unions, upon renegotiation, sought to pass on to the worker part or all of the social security increase either by adjusting the formula or by completely divorcing

the formula from social security benefits. This pressure, stemming originally from the substantial amendments to the Social Security Act in 1950, was reenforced by the additional increases under the Federal program in the autumn of 1954.¹

One National Conference Industrial Board survey shows that 290 out of 438 companies (66.2%) have pension plans. 189 of these (65.2%) pay the entire cost of the pension.

In another study by the Board in which the retirement plans of 327 companies, with more than 4 million employees, and engaged in 20 different types of business were reviewed, 139 of these offered non-contributory plans and 19 of them paid retirement annuities amounting to 2% or more of salary times the number of years' service. Assuming 30 years service, the retired pay factor would be 60% or more of the employee's salary; assuming 35 years service, the factor would be 70%.

It should be pointed out here that military retirement percentages authorized by the Career Compensation Act of 1949 are computed on basic pay only. For this reason, the so-called entitlement to "75%" of active duty pay after 30 years service amounts to considerably less than that ratio when related to the full military compensation, including basic pay and allowances. A typical example of the true percentage value of military retirement is the situation of a Colonel (married) with over 30 years service. His total compensation would amount to \$11,951 per year; however, his retirement pay is computed on basic pay only, with the result that his retired pay of \$7300 is only 61% of his income while on active duty.

¹Health, Insurance and Pension Plans in Union Contracts, (Washington: Department of Labor Bulletin #1187, October 1955)

The Committee on Retirement Policy for Federal Personnel (Kaplan Committee) in its report of May 13, 1954 summarized this situation as follows:

The amount of retired pay for nondisability retirement provided by the uniformed services retirement system is equal to $2\frac{1}{2}$ percent of base pay multiplied by the number of years of service, up to a maximum of 75 percent of basic pay. However, if retired pay is related to gross military pay rather than solely to basic pay, this $2\frac{1}{2}$ -percent figure is substantially reduced. When related to total salary, including allowances for dependents and hazardous-duty pay, the uniformed services retirement system provides benefits which are less than 2 per cent of pay per year of service, and for enlisted personnel with 35 or 40 years of service the corresponding figure is only about 1 per cent. This compares to a benefit per year of service of 2 percent under the Foreign Service retirement system, and a percentage which ranges from $2\frac{1}{2}$ percent for some groups to a minimum of $1\frac{1}{2}$ percent under the civil-service retirement system.

Another factor which tends to make the present uniformed services retirement benefits unsatisfactory in some cases is that no more than 30 years of service may be credited. Consequently, the "unit of benefit" for those who serve more than 30 years is sharply reduced..... The percentages of maximum gross pay per year of service for personnel with 40 years of service vary from 0.89 percent for pay grade E-4 to 1.36 percent for pay grade O-6. Since the higher "units of benefit" accrue to personnel with less than 30 years of service, this means that those who serve a lifetime in the uniformed services are rewarded with smaller benefit units than personnel who are "selected out" prior to completion of their normal tour of duty.¹

¹Report of the Committee on Retirement Policy for Federal Personnel of May 13, 1954, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954).

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY

Both naval and military pay in the Armed Services in the United States are modeled upon the naval and military pay systems of Great Britain at the time of the Revolution. Enlisted men of the British service in those days were definitely from the lower strata of society, whereas the officers, inasmuch as commissions were purchased, usually were men of some private means. In addition, service in those days was predominantly afloat in the Navy and in garrisons in the Army.

Thus, the pay system was designed to meet minimum needs rather than to reward contribution. This philosophy has dominated the United States military pay scale from its inception, and, as a result, the rates of actual cash pay were low based upon the fact that military personnel were furnished, except in most unusual cases, quarters aboard ship or in cantonments and were also furnished a ration in kind as any other means of feeding the crew of a vessel or a regiment in the field would have been most impractical. Uniforms were furnished for enlisted personnel, but not for officers who were expected to provide their own.

One result of this belief, namely that service life would be afloat or in the field, was that until 1899 naval officers were paid their full pay only when on duty at sea.

If assigned to shore duty, naval officers received only seventy-five percent of their basic pay, and if unassigned, were furloughed at a fifty percent rate.

In contrast, in the Army the full rate of pay was paid whether on duty with the troops or at the seat of the Government or on detached duty. The numbers assigned to the latter two categories were of course very small. The furlough provision, however, was the same for both services and was very extensively used in the Army between the Mexican and Civil Wars.

Naval pay was on a lower scale than that of the Army. Naval personnel, however, had frequent opportunities of augmenting their pay through prize money. The captain of the frigate *Constellation*, during one six-months' cruise in the Caribbean during our almost forgotten war against the French, was awarded \$187,000 in prize money, a very substantial fortune, indeed, for that period in our history. Many others achieved a comfortable competence through this means.

When ordered to shore, however, the naval officer not only lost this opportunity for financial gain, but also had his actual pay reduced by twenty-five percent. It can well be seen, therefore, that employment on shore was not popular among naval officers.

A further detriment to shore duty arose from the fact that naval installations, then as now, were for the most part located in the large seaports where the price of the land alone was sufficient to prevent the building of an adequate amount of housing for the resulting concentration of naval population in

these circumscribed areas.

At the close of the Civil War in 1866, with the demobilization of the large Civil War fleet and the consequent necessity of a greater number of naval officers being employed on the beach to carry out this demobilization, the situation became so acute that the Secretary was authorized to pay to naval officers so employed an additional one-third of their pay when employed ashore in the best interests of the naval service. Until 1948 Naval Regulations required that the orders of officers to shore duty contain a statement to this effect.

The Army officer in the early days of the republic, was for the most part quartered in government quarters. Installations, by and large, consisted of permanent forts and stations at some distance - in those days - from crowded urban areas, or in completely isolated portions of our country. Therefore the provision of quarters for these people was essential as they would have had no other place to live, and most of the older installations were well provided with housing for garrisons of the size that then existed.

At the close of the Civil War, however, just as in the Navy, a disproportionate number of Army officers was required to service at other than permanent installations of the War Department with resulting expense to those officers. Therefore, in 1870 the Army was authorized to pay such officers a "commutation of quarters, subsistence, and forage allowances" when public quarters were not available, and subsistence and forage allowances were not paid in kind.

This act was somewhat indefinite and was not formalized until 1873 at which time, by the act of June 18 of that year, officers of the Army to whom public quarters were not available were authorized to receive "commutation of quarters" at the rate of \$12 per room per month, with the maximum number of rooms permitted as follows: 2 for a second lieutenant, 3 for a first lieutenant, 4 for a captain, 5 for a major, 6 for a lieutenant colonel, 7 for a colonel, 8 for a brigadier, 9 for a major general, and 10 for a lieutenant general.

In addition a specified number of candles or their equivalent were allowed for lighting purposes and specified amount of coal per room, varying with the geographical location of the officer, was allowed for heat. In 1907 the provision of candles and coal was changed to authorize the actual expense of heating and lighting quarters. This "commutation of quarters" was the forerunner of our present rental allowance system.

The result of these two varying systems was that the average naval officer received while on the beach his original base pay; in other words, seventy-five percent of his basic pay plus one-third of his shore pay, whereas the average Army officer received his basic pay plus quarters or commutation thereof.

With the lower rate of pay prevailing in the Navy, this discrepancy led to a great deal of dissatisfaction which was intensified by the fact that, during this period of time, both departments, War and Navy, together with the State Department

were quartered in the same building, now entirely occupied by the Bureau of the Budget. This bill placed the Army and naval officers on the same basic pay scale and provided uniform "commutation of quarters" for both services.

Discrepancies continued to exist, however, until 1918 because of the fact that married Army officers did not lose their entitlement to "commutation of quarters" when ordered to duty in the field whereas all naval officers lost their entitlement when ordered to duty afloat. Although this discrepancy was corrected by legislation late in 1918 the difficulty and complexity of administering the "commutation of quarters" system led to the adoption in 1922 of our present rental and subsistence allowance system which, originally applicable to officers only, has been gradually extended now to cover, in one form or another, all military personnel with dependents whose place of duty precludes the furnishing of government quarters. Those without dependents receive no rental allowances while serving afloat or in the field.

The present concepts for determination of basic pay have developed slowly. The first step toward a common basic pay scale for the Army and the Navy was taken in 1899 when pay of officer personnel was put on the same basis.

With the passage of the 1908 Pay Act a concept of pay for skills evolved. This act favored enlisted personnel with technical skills but provided that the base pay for any rank could not exceed the base pay and longevity of the next higher rank.

The Pay Readjustment Act of 1922 introduced the concept of equal pay for equal rank in lieu of pay for skills. Length of service was the controlling factor in determining rates of pay.

The Career Compensation Act of 1949 was the first major change in the pay structure since 1922 and was designed to secure and retain qualified personnel. Refinements of this law were effected by the Armed Forces Pay Act of 1952.

In order to stem the prohibitive losses in military personnel to the civilian economy by increasing the attractiveness of the military career, the Career Incentive Act of 1955 was enacted which, in addition to a number of other features, provided pay increases at the critical points in the career pattern.

PART TWO

CHAPTER VIII

MAINTAINING A QUALITY FORCE IN TIMES OF ADVANCING TECHNOLOGY

In Part One I developed the trends of military motivation and value systems in order to prepare the reader for the military problems facing our nation today. Now the reader should be better able to understand some of the statements currently being made by our administration officials on the personnel problems of the four services. During the past year there has been a great deal of activity in the halls of Congress and widespread coverage in the press and columns on the subject of personnel losses and technician shortages in the Armed Forces. Since the end of fighting in Korea, the number one problem, once again, of the military forces has been the excessive personnel turnover. Before Korea, with a predominantly volunteer strength of about 1½ million, about 60% of our personnel were reenlisting. This produced an experienced enlisted personnel structure and provided a valuable nucleus for the rapid Korean build up. After Korea, in 1954, the reenlistment rate fell to its lowest point, about 18%, which was considerably below the minimum required to maintain a reasonable stable force.

In the foreseeable future we will have to maintain Armed Forces which are and will continue to be gigantic when compared to our Armed Forces during any comparable period of peace. This will be true even if we can come to some agreement with Russia on disarmament. Size and numbers are not by any means the whole problem. The days when a first class Army can be recruited from the "gutters of the capitals of Europe as did Frederick the Great" disappeared with the advent of mass armies and now we have reached such a point of technological advance that numbers alone are not sufficient.

The complexity of equipment and warfare demand a great deal more than the ability to march and take orders. There is an ever-increasing requirement for personnel with real ability and training at every echelon. This is caused by the headlong rush of technological discovery. These dramatic technological changes are generally illustrated by atomic submarines, electronics, supersonic aircraft and missiles, but compare the infantry man who moves by helicopter, controls guided missiles, and operates over a battlefield of hundreds of miles in extent with the man in a jeep.

We need first a high quality input of both officers and enlisted men. Then at the end of obligated service we need selectivity to such a degree as to be able to take only the better qualified man or officer. We are not getting this selectivity now. We are not able to retain sufficient numbers of officers or men without regard to quality beyond obligated service.

There is only a certain number of people in our population who can be motivated towards a career in the Armed Services whatever advantages are offered. This number is hard to determine as we at present do not have a true test at the market place. It is impossible to determine how many men and officers who come into the service, while not drafted, may have been influenced to do so by the draft. A percentage of these are in the service so as to get rid of their obligation to their country as soon as possible and return to civilian life. Then others, while tempted to remain for a career, are influenced to leave the service by the higher pay of civilian industry. This is particularly so for those men who have been trained in military schools and whose training has direct application to civil jobs.

One of the most significant points in the reenlistment picture is that the officers who have the most day-to-day contact and influence over the individual man are in the main only fulfilling obligated service of some kind prior to returning to civilian life. Seventy percent of the junior officers only complete obligated service. The constant turnover of commissioned junior supervisors and their experience and attitude shortcomings are distinctly contributory to enlisted career dissatisfaction. This turnover of officers together with the lack of quality selection caused by too few officers seeking a career is causing a weakness in our junior officer structure. This, then, is the problem area. To correct it both an increase in numbers as well as an increase in quality are needed. In order

to get the type of young man who has the potential to command ever more powerful, complex and technologically advanced armed forces of the future, a career has to offer a challenge to his ability, a worthwhile life work, and reasonable material benefits. The services certainly can offer the first two, but there is doubt if they are keeping pace in the last requirement -- material benefits. In order to attract a young man of ability, he must be able to look forward to a salary which will allow him to bring up his family in comparative circumstances to those in the other service professions (doctors, lawyers, government, engineers, etc.).

Over the years since 1908, as pointed out in Part One, when a military salary and fringe benefits were ahead of other service professions, the trend has been for the material rewards of other professions to advance much faster than has the military, particularly so in the higher military grades.

CHAPTER IX

DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION

In the following pages I will attempt to identify, define, and analyze those special characteristics of military organizations which make them unique in contemporary society. These distinguishing features can be organized under the following grouping: social organization, motivations, and value systems. All of these categories of characteristics are inter-related and are merely varied expressions of the same central set of ideas. This ideological unity results from the formative, compelling pressures exerted by the very function that all military organizations exist to serve; to fight. While the society they serve may undergo great changes in attitudes, ideals and organization, the military arm of that society remains much less affected because its function of physical defense of the society remains unchanged. War, no matter what its technological, geographical or political context, always requires that groups of men impose by violence their will on other groups of men in situations of psychological stress and physical danger. It is the constancy of this function, and the response of men to the situations that it creates, that imposes on military organizations their special and relatively unchanging characteristics.

This function-derived orientation is responsible, in part, for the "military mind" and imposes on military organizations their broad similarities despite wide differences in time and nationality. The inherent and often-noted conservatism of military men and groups is thus not sheer perverse reluctance to change, but is the result of the values instilled into them by their function and its environment.

The outstanding social characteristic of military organizations is the primary of the group welfare. The physical and psychological isolation of battle situations requires that a military organization be a complete community in miniature. These same stresses develop a high degree of group identification and solidarity. Coupled with those conditions is the realization by the members of the group that success and even survival depend on the efforts of the group working as a group. Mutual interdependence and support are other aspects of this same basic condition. Cumulatively, these considerations lead to a strongly "organic" view of the military society, recognizing that the group possesses a life, identity, and purpose greater than, and independent of, the sum total of the individuals that compose it.

Military camaraderie, esprit de corps, and unit identification are expressions of the powerful, rewarding and essential sense of belonging which accompanies this interdependent and organic view.

Other characteristics associated with the typical military organization are that it is authoritarian, disciplinarian,

strongly governed by laws rather than by men, and it is hierarchical in structure. Clearly defined and stratified classes are an almost universal feature of a military society. United States Forces are no exception, notwithstanding the efforts of democratization following World War II. (The experience of the Russian Army during the 1920's and 30's in attempting to eliminate these features of a military organization is most interesting. By the end of World War II, the Russian Army had become one of the most extreme advocates of those very qualities it had once sought to eliminate.)

The traits of authority, discipline, formalism and hierarchy are essential ones in a military group and are readily deducible from the environmental considerations outlined earlier. In turn, if the environmental and social characteristics of a military society are used as a basis, the more specific motivations and value systems of the military become apparent as logical extensions of these more fundamental characteristics. Several examples will serve to illustrate this point.

Responsibility, authority and prestige, the central concerns of any organization, are clearly tied to the hierarchy of ranks in military groups. This makes the systems more important than the individual and makes the position and not its occupant the locus of its associated authority, responsibility and privilege. The reason for this attitude is fairly straightforward. Combat situations may require the assumption of command by persons who simply have not had an opportunity to demonstrate their leadership skill; yet immediate exercise of authority is

enables the worker to accumulate sufficient financial rewards to enjoy the way of life he prefers. Military service is a total way of life, dominated by the exigencies of a potential survival struggle and by the weight of its collective group responsibility. It is strongly oriented to the primacy of the group's welfare. Under these conditions military personnel are expected to contribute whatever are their talents, wherever they may be needed and in a manner dictated by the needs of the group. The desires of the individual must be subordinated to the achievement of the group goal. Everyone serves as best he can and takes the inherent risks, rewards and deprivations as chance or assignment may bring them. In these circumstances, while some individuals may be more important than others, all are essential, and even the relative importance of an individual may oscillate over a wide range. Under this system, differential rewards are made on the basis of responsibility assumed and level of skill exhibited (i.e., degree of application to the task at hand). These it is assumed are the result of individual effort and are rewardable on a differential basis. Varieties of skill are not considered a basis for differential reward since they are to a large extent inherent traits or at the least, non-controllable by the individual, and all of them are necessary to the military community.

Two other considerations justify this system of selective limited rewards. First, there is the immense practical difficulty of attempting to administer a differential reward system based on kind of skill under the confusing and rapidly changing

conditions of a survival-struggle situation (which is the normal, even though not the usual, climate of a military organization). Secondly, in an organization where personal desires and occupational mobility are severely limited by group welfare considerations, it would be grossly unfair to make rewards or compensations dependent on occupation.

Rewards and motivations, of course, are closely linked. In military service both of these consist of intangible or idealistic factors to a much greater degree than is common in most other social units (the clergy is an obvious exception. The disastrous effects of overconcern with material rewards on the clergy's effectiveness in the 15th Century, should also be noted).

The West Point motto of "Duty, Honor and Country" is a perfect example of this highly idealistic motivation. Obviously, not all military officers live by this code; some cannot, some will not, and a great number, culturally conditioned by a climate of opinion which attaches a faintly derogatory connotation to these terms, cannot articulate their real belief in such concepts. But consciously or not, military personnel respond to these motivations. "Duty" is a recognition of the fact that the job and the welfare of the group come first, personal considerations, second. "Honor" demands the keeping of faith with other members of the group, what one member does or fails to do reflects on all. "Country" implies the subordination and dedication of a military organization to that

larger group which it serves, military organizations being uniquely and totally service organizations.

The common thread running through all of these motivations is the subordination and sublimation of self in a task of transcendent importance, the physical defense of a nation. It is this fact that gives professional military personnel an outlook that differs radically from that of their civilian contemporaries. It is this sublimation of self with its associated sense of belonging that supply the rich psychological satisfactions that reward military personnel and compensate them for their more obvious losses of personal freedom.

Admittedly, the above is a statement of the ideal rather than the actual. A casual survey of military organizations and personnel would reveal departures in varying degrees from this ideal. A similar comparison would be between the loftiness and fervor of the principles of the church during the Middle Ages and what has been so aptly termed, "the spotted reality". Yet it is included at this point to supplement a purely descriptive account with a more prescriptive one. An ideal or yardstick is needed against which to measure current practices and proposed changes.

CHAPTER X

THE ENLISTED PERSONNEL PROBLEM

As a member of the Cordiner Committee I was directed to determine reenlistment rates and the causes of low reenlistments. In the pages to follow I will draw heavily on some of the findings arrived at in carrying out these study areas.

Reenlistments, by which an enlisted man extends his tenure in the military service, was the principal point of concern in my examination of the enlisted personnel situation. The rate at which men reenlist is an indication of the stability of the force. It is an indication of the rate of flow of knowledge, experience and skill into the enlisted workforce.

The point of service at which improved reenlistments would provide the maximum gain in the development of a quality enlisted force is at the end of the initial period of service. The first term is the key man in this situation. At the end of his initial enlistment he reaches a significant milestone in his career planning. He is faced at this critical point with deciding whether to continue in a service career or to seek employment in civil life. At this point he has little time invested in the service.

A majority of these individuals have learned a useful trade during their initial period of service. Attractive civilian pursuits which afford greater immediate and long-range economic reward than the military career appeal to him very

strongly.

Experience has shown that a great many of the career service men never actively choose the military as a career. It merely grew on them one reenlistment at a time. The progressive improvement in reenlistment rates experience in second and subsequent reenlistments gives added credence to the significance of the first reenlistment.

Figure 2 is a graphic portrayal of the first-term reenlistment rates from the end of Korea in 1954 to July of 1956. The "First Term Reenlistment" rate increased from a low of 10% in 1954 to 23% through 1956.¹

The "Career" reenlistment rates which are shown as dotted lines on the chart represent those who have reenlisted at least once. These men are very important to the maintenance of a balanced force, but they are also the group that must be watched carefully to avoid over-saturation in specific skill areas, as well as a general aging of the force. Note that their rate has increased from below 40% in 1954 to about 90% in 1956, giving emphasis to future problems of increased age, promotion stagnation, and increased numbers of dependence.

One of the problems facing the four services is the need for a reenlistment control at each career reenlistment stage which will restrict reenlistments to meet specific service requirements by rank and by definitive speciality and skill level. Career people in critical occupational areas should be

¹Report of the Defense Advisory Committee on Professional and Technical Compensation, May 1957, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957).

required to possess qualifications which will clearly provide a basis for progress to the upper levels of their particular skill or occupational area. Career reenlistees in occupational areas already in proper balance must possess qualifications which clearly indicate an ability to progress to the upper level of the occupational structure or be readily retrainable to other occupational areas where a requirement exists.

Causes of Low Reenlistment Rates

In order to determine why more men do not remain in the military services we consolidated attitude surveys of the armed forces and those of non-government agencies. We also identified many of the factors by extensive travel to military bases in and outside of the United States. In this manner, plus the convening of symposia of senior career enlisted personnel, many of the factors which had previously been detected through scientific research were verified by the men themselves.

After a detailed study of these factors it was concluded that pay alone is not to blame for the current manpower difficulties in all the services. It was also equally concluded that pay alone would not remedy the situation.

The relative lack of prestige of the man in uniform was established as being one of the major deterrents in the achievement of a higher-term reenlistment rate.

In 1956 I heard Dr. George Gallup speak on this very subject. He directed a survey, at the request of the Department of Defense, on the attitudes of civilians towards a military career. He concluded that a career in the military service

does not carry great prestige with adults, at least as of today. This is true of both officers and enlisted personnel. Inadequate financial awards, dislike of service discipline and regimentation, lack of adequate family life and less opportunity to advance than in civilian life are the greatest drawbacks of a military career in the public's mind.

This lowering of noncommissioned officer prestige not only adversely affects the reenlistment intentions of senior career people, but it also results in poorer administration and removes the goals and incentives for a first term man to advance and make a career of the Service. The present level of economic incentives offered to enlisted men is the major cause of low prestige as the comparatively low standard-of-living of the enlisted personnel commands little respect in the community.

The Lure of Civilian Employment Opportunity

The lure of civilian employment opportunities is a major cause factor in the excessive enlisted personnel turnover rate. A readily apparent disparity exists between the compensation received in civilian employment as compared to that in the military services.

Confronted with long periods of enforced absence from their families, duty in uncomfortable and isolated locations and other rigorous features of military life, the first-term enlisted man finds the advantages of civilian employment even more attractive. Evidence of plentiful jobs is apparent in daily newspapers.

In order to obtain factual data regarding the opportunities military men are finding so attractive, the Department of Defense engaged the services of the civilian management consultant firm, The McKinsey Company.

The significant facts produced by the McKinsey Company study are:

1. The serviceman concluding his first term of service can normally expect higher pay in a starting civilian job than he is receiving in the military.
2. Promotional opportunities in civilian life are greater than those afforded the career enlisted man.
3. Fringe benefits no longer favor the enlisted man over his civilian counterpart except for the 20year retirement option.

The complete McKinsey survey provides specific comparison data on fourteen occupational groups.

These comparisons show the wage advantages in both technical and non-technical occupations in civilian life. Military pay is reasonably comparable to that of the civilian during the early periods of employment. The gap begins to widen noticeably at the point of decision for reenlistment. In addition, promotion to supervisory positions in civilian life means moving to a completely new and higher wage rate.

Conclusions of the McKinsey study were verified by a further analysis of current laws. Under the minimum wage law, the least a man leaving service can expect to earn in covered employment is \$1,824 per year after taxes. Computation of

average conditions for the first termor indicate his income from \$1,328 to \$1,560 after taxes. Minimum wage law jobs offer the first termor nearly \$500 more net cash income than that received by the E-3 and over \$250 more than the E-4, average first term grades.

Actual experience shows the average first termor leaving the service receives much better than the minimum wage. In the recent Air Force study of 3,000 airmen leaving the service, the average man started in civilian life at approximately \$2,700 per year after taxes. A year later he was earning \$3,200 after taxes.

More important than initial advantages are the long-term economic opportunities available in civilian life in contrast to the flat, compressed wage progression pattern in the military service.

CHAPTER XI

THE OFFICER PROBLEM

As the end of initial enlistment marks the critical retention point for enlisted men, so does the end of original obligated service mark the critical retention point for officers. At this point, the young officer, who has little time invested in the service, is faced with the decision whether to continue in a service career or to seek employment and a career in civilian life.

It is also at this point that the young officer has acquired enough experience to be of real value to the service, and he has served long enough to permit a valid evaluation of his future potential. If the military officer career provided compelling, long-term attractions, the Armed Forces would be in a position to select for continued service those high quality officers whose current capabilities and future leadership are so urgently required. Figure 3 shows that in 1957 a minimum of 15,000 high quality officers were needed beyond obligated service, but only 10,000 were willing to remain. 96% of those willing were selected to remain on active duty.¹

Our military establishment can be only as good as its officers. The effectiveness of national security is not measured

¹Military Pay Proposal (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, February 1958).

OFFICER RETENTION




Figure 3

only by the total numbers of men or the ships, planes, tanks and missiles available. The quality of its leadership is the limiting factor. The officer group must provide the direction, the decisiveness, the inspiration which gives life and effect to the enlisted men.

Inadequate retention of officers means that the operating forces must constantly perform their tasks with an excessive percentage of officers undergoing their initial duty experience. Another effect of inadequate retention is the impact of the void their loss creates upon normal assignment patterns for the remaining officers. As the number of officers falls short of needs, it becomes increasingly difficult to insure that those available have the normal progression of assignments required for their development or to give them a reasonable opportunity to lead a normal life. This failure makes the careers they actually experience less satisfying to them, and, like a snowball rolling down hill, adds to the loss rate. It also compels the Service all too frequently to make assignments which do not economically use the officer talent available.

Young officers of high caliber facing the decision of whether or not they should continue in the military profession inevitably measure the comparative standard-of-living and respect they can expect to enjoy as members of the armed forces against what they can aspire to in civilian pursuits. The inability of senior officers to accumulate a financial reserve, to provide their children with a college education without unwarranted sacrifice, to afford housing appropriate to their

rank and position, and the comparatively low opinion of the officer profession held by the majority of civilians -- all tend to reduce the attractiveness of the military career to the young officer and his family. He measures the intrinsic value of a military career in terms of the prestige accorded his seniors who have reached the higher levels of their profession. He recognizes that only after meeting repeated competitive promotion standards and developing a high degree of professional skill can he hope to attain senior rank -- yet the tangible emoluments currently associated with senior rank provide little incentive -- particularly when weighed with the frequent transfers and instability imposed by military life.

Greater Financial Opportunities in Civilian Life

In contrast to the inadequate compensation afforded successful military officers, the young officer finds that the successful college-graduate engaged in civilian pursuits can look forward to progressively increasing financial rewards. The greater financial opportunities in civilian life consistently appear as a major reason why officers leave the service.

Accordingly, the Committee made a detailed analysis and comparison of the wage/salary levels of industry and those of the military. This review concluded that:

1. Present pay at the 2nd Lt/Ensign level is reasonable and comparable to that offered to the college-graduate as a starting salary in industry, considering the Service obligation of officers entering the military profession.
2. After three years, the average military officer

receives an increase of 34.2% -- whereas the average individual in industry receives an increase of 73.9%.

3. The total compensations for senior officers are far below compensations for comparable responsibilities in civilian life.

Figure 4 depicts the above comparison graphically. Data is based on Hook Commission studies brought up-to-date by statistics furnished by the Department of Commerce and the McKinsey Company.¹

This comparison dramatically demonstrates that although current pay up through Major/Lt. Commander is only slightly below the civilian averages, the military pay in higher grades falls progressively further below the civilian rates. In the general and flag officer grades (O-7 and up), the military pay is far below the minimum of the ranges for civilian counterparts.

p. 93. ¹Report of the Defense Advisory Committee, op. cit.,

The first of these is the fact that the system is not a simple one. It is a complex system, and the complexity is not only in the number of components, but also in the way they are connected. The second is that the system is not a static one. It is a dynamic system, and the dynamics are not only in the way the components interact, but also in the way the system evolves over time. The third is that the system is not a linear one. It is a non-linear system, and the non-linearity is not only in the way the components interact, but also in the way the system evolves over time. The fourth is that the system is not a deterministic one. It is a stochastic system, and the stochasticity is not only in the way the components interact, but also in the way the system evolves over time. The fifth is that the system is not a simple one. It is a complex system, and the complexity is not only in the number of components, but also in the way they are connected. The sixth is that the system is not a static one. It is a dynamic system, and the dynamics are not only in the way the components interact, but also in the way the system evolves over time. The seventh is that the system is not a linear one. It is a non-linear system, and the non-linearity is not only in the way the components interact, but also in the way the system evolves over time. The eighth is that the system is not a deterministic one. It is a stochastic system, and the stochasticity is not only in the way the components interact, but also in the way the system evolves over time.

CHAPTER XII

COMPENSATION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

In the matter of rewards, military organizations depend to a great extent on a similar set of symbolic and largely intangible features. Insignia of rank, citations, parades and ceremonies, badges, letters of commendation, and ribbons all play a large part in the military system of compensation.

However, it is obvious that military personnel do receive and must receive some form of material or financial compensation. How much financial compensation is, of course, a question of some importance; but the really crucial question in military compensation systems is the form and assumptions under which compensation is given.

There are two general approaches to the problem of financially compensating military personnel. The first of these assumes that men can be hired and paid enough to perform tasks required by a military organization. This is essentially a mercenary approach. If this approach of paying men sufficient to do a given job is used, other characteristics of military organizations previously described (discipline, formalism) will be either suppressed or distorted. Obviously, for example, the idealistic motivation will either disappear or take the form of loyalty to small groups or individuals. It cannot be too strongly emphasized, however, that paying military personnel

for the job they do, involves the fundamental choice of a philosophy which has wide ramifications throughout the military organization.

From about the 14th to the 19th centuries mercenary armies were fairly common in Europe. The special conditions which made their use possible were:

1. The existence of a large depressed class of people whose normal conditions of existence were so "nasty, brutish, and short", that military service and combat did not represent an extraordinary situation.

2. The likelihood that war would provide sufficient economic gains (from looting and confiscation) to finance mercenary forces.

3. The relatively low intensity of war's violence as compared with that of either modern or ancient times (the classic campaigns of maneuver and position with fighting confined to the summer season are typical of mercenary armies during these centuries.

The more violent battles of this period were almost invariably fought by non-mercenary forces (e.g. Cromwell's campaigns and the Wars of Religion). The French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, the rise of nationalism, and the increasing violence of modern war ended that transitory period in which mercenary forces were feasible. In those cases where mercenary forces had been employed they were found to be, almost without exception, inefficient, ineffective, and notoriously undependable. Machiavelli warned against them; 15th Century Florence

relied on them and lost disastrously; and the Hessians of George III were more a liability than an asset during the American Revolution.

The essential reason why mercenary forces are undependable under the best of circumstances, and have become unthinkable in the last 150 years, is that no form of financial reward can possibly compensate men for the ordeal of battle. In peacetime it may be possible to ^{buy} buoy the skills necessary to maintain a military organization; but, as has been stated, the battle is the payoff. What happens when this peacetime-mercenary organization is committed to combat? What pay scale is equivalent to the virtual annihilation so common among units immediately engaged at the outbreak of war? Indeed, how to motivate and lead a peacetime force into battle when its members have been conditioned to think, "Am I getting paid what the job is worth?" What is the proper relationship between the pay scales of a combat infantryman and an electronics technician who will never come under enemy fire? Impossible questions of equity, morale, and motivation are raised by any system of military compensation which attempts to pay its personnel for the job they do.

The second general approach to the problem of financially compensating military personnel depends on an entirely different premise. This approach assumes that monetary compensation offered to military personnel is for the purpose of guaranteeing to them an adequate standard of living so that their full attention may be concentrated on the job they have to per-

form. This approach is in complete consonance with those other special characteristics of military organizations which have been described previously. It may in actual practice eventuate in a pay package of the same absolute size (for a given individual) as under the pay-for-the-job system of compensation.

In addition, this non-mercenary approach produces a climate of opinion and favors attitudes which are highly conducive to the development of the characteristics of an ideal military organization. In essence, the guaranteed standard of living pay system reduces the need for military personnel to be concerned about their personal welfare, and enables them to focus their attention on their job, purely for the sake of the job.

(Devices such as hazardous duty pay for flyers and submariners are not a violation of this concept. They are simply a recognition of the fact that these personnel bear a heavier-than-normal load of responsibility, and that they face, permanently, a degree of risk greatly in excess of that normally associated with military service. The basic feature of the pay-for-the-job concept is missing here since hazardous duty pay is, by industry standards, inadequate. It is a token or symbolic reward, albeit, a financial one.)

required. By attaching this authority to the position rather than to specific individuals, it becomes available in emergency to whomever happens to occupy this position. Similarly, in times of rapid expansion, military forces seldom have enough people who by virtue of their personal qualities can easily or effectively assume responsibility and exercise authority. By making the system the seat of these qualities, the average individual can function as part of the system with reasonable effectiveness and the mission of the group can be achieved. ("Salute the uniform, not the man.") This is not an excuse for poor leaders. Perhaps no where is the need for genuine leadership so urgent as in military organizations. But this respect for the position and not the individual does enable the military to surmount the deficiencies of its few weak members as well as situations such as just noted.

The military emphasis on distinctive dress and insignia is a reflection of the organic nature of military society with its group demands and sense-of-belonging as a reward. Special dress and insignia also serve to reinforce the hierarchical structure of the military society by indicating, for all to recognize, the exact sub-group to which each individual belongs.

In the matter of work systems, motivating influences and forms of compensation, military organizations have a number of unique practices that are directly attributable to their special environmental and social characteristics. Briefly outlined, the assumptions which underlie these practices are as follows. Military service is not a job in the sense that it

CHAPTER XIII

THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM AND A LASTING SOLUTION

The officer corps of modern military groups is composed largely of full-time professional military leaders and the enlisted personnel represent a cross-section of the whole society. For several centuries prior to 1800 armies were officered by "amateurs" drawn solely from the aristocracy. Unlisted personnel were generally drawn from only the very lowest classes of society.

The combination of professional officers and a citizen-soldier Army has developed in roughly the last 150 years; it was also characteristic of military organizations of the Middle Ages. This seems significant, for a closer comparison of medieval society as a whole with the characteristics of military organizations as outlined above indicated that there is a striking similarity between the two "cultures".

A listing of some of the characteristics of medieval society will serve to illustrate dramatically this remarkable parallelism. These characteristics are: acceptance of the necessity of authority; a hierarchy of easily identified and rigidly defined social classes; an organic view of the nature of human societies; a theological-idealistic motivation; and emphasis on distinctive dress.

This similarity is more than accidental; it is more than

the result of the conservatism of military organizations in clinging to a vanished way of life. The basic reason for the resemblance is that both societies, military and medieval, were molded by the same environmental pressures. The whole structure of medieval society developed out of the violence, strife, and community isolation of the preceding Dark Ages. Except for a brief interlude of stability under Charlemagne in the early 9th Century, the whole period from the collapse of the Roman Empire to the beginning of the 12th Century Renaissance was marked by the extreme isolation of each community and its almost total preoccupation with the simple struggle for physical survival. Violence and disorder were common; communication was extremely limited. Each locality had to be self-sufficient and constantly capable of defending itself. In these circumstances the knights and local lords became, perforce, a group of professional military leaders and all of their fief holders and vassals were obliged to serve under them when a fighting force was required.

In short, the characteristics of the Middle Ages had their genesis in the fact that a whole society faced a survival-struggle situation. This combination of environmental factors, however, is a continuing condition in a military organization of any era when it is called upon to perform its normal function. It may be fairly deduced, then, that the resemblance between medieval society and the military element of contemporary society is a broadly casual one and not accidental.

To describe military organizations as being essentially

medieval in character is to indicate immediately the tremendous gulf that separates modern civil society from the military arm that serves it. Merely to enumerate the respective characteristics of modern civil society and military organizations underscores this difference. Military organizations are authoritarian, formalistic, hierarchical, and class-stratified; modern civil society is liberal, democratic, permissive, fluid, largely classless, and almost entirely egalitarian. Military personnel are predominantly idealistically motivated. The prevailing conviction in western culture at large is that man responds best to motivations of material gain. Whereas military organizations hold an organic view of the nature of human societies and are profoundly historical in their appreciation of the past, contemporary political thought stresses the atomistic conception of society and looks not to the past for guidance, but to the future for change and constant improvement in the condition of man.

In the light of the foregoing discussion the real heart of the personnel problem for contemporary military services is clear. The services are attempting to recruit and retain personnel for an organization whose structure and values belong to an older and generally repudiated culture. The sole source of personnel for these military organizations is a civil society in which nearly every important value is in disagreement with that of the military services. As is the case whenever two dynamic systems are in contact, the rate of flow from one to the other depends on the differential between them. In this

particular case the high rate of flow of personnel from military service back to civilian life is a function of the very wide difference in values and sociological organizations between the two "cultures".

The temptingly easy solution to this problem is, of course, to modify the military organization in the direction of civil society so as to reduce the sharp differential between the two groups, and thereby to lessen the rate of flow. Such a course of action, however, runs the certain risk of impairing the functional efficiency of the military services. One of the central theses of this paper is that military values and organization are not historically determined (although they have numerous historical precedents) but are functionally determined. Changes which introduce antithetical principles inevitably detract from the military organization's ability to discharge its essential responsibilities at the moment of crisis, in actual battle.

Let military organizations retain, then, and even strengthen, their special characteristics. Examine every proposed change in the military services to be sure that it either emphasizes the values of a military group, or that, at worst, it does not contradict them.

If this solution is accepted the two important questions become: (a) "What will happen to the rate of flow of personnel back to civilian life (the non-reenlistment rate) if the special characteristics of military organizations are strengthened?"; and (b), "What other steps in consonance with the special

characteristics of military organizations can be taken which will increase the attractiveness of military service as a career?"

The answer to the first question seems to be that the net effect would be small. This answer depends on the premise that an individual's reaction to the special characteristics of military organizations ("military life in general") is a fairly fundamental and relatively unchanging aspect of an individual's personal make-up. For those who are sympathetic to military values a strengthening of these values and their associated sociological organization would be welcome and a positive career attraction. For those who are repelled by military life this strengthening of military values would be an added deterrent to career service, but would, in effect, merely confirm a decision already certain.

Evidence to support this conclusion is available in the results of the USAF Quarterly Survey, a random sample of the attitudes of Air Force military personnel. Among first term airmen who intend to reenlist, the third ranking reason is, "Like military life". Among those who do not intend to reenlist, "dislike of military life", is the third ranking reason for their decision. The fact that both groups rank their reaction to military life, as it affects their reenlistment intention, so high indicates that there are some radically different responses to essentially the same conditions. This sharply different evaluation of similar factors underlines the intensely personal reaction of different individuals to military service.

Most interesting, however, is the fact that among all categories of personnel (officers and enlisted) who are undecided about their career intentions, either like or dislike of military life is not a factor of significance in affecting their intentions. Strengthening of the special characteristics of military life would not greatly influence the undecided group, and hence, would not appreciably alter the non-reenlistment rate.

An extension of the above analysis suggests a partial answer to the second question proposed earlier, "What other steps in consonance with the special characteristics of military organizations can be taken which will increase the attractiveness of military service as a career?"

If there are personnel who are inherently predisposed to accept the values and social structure of military organizations, and it is these personnel who eventually become career men, two courses of action are suggested. The most obvious, of course, is that technical training should be concentrated in this category of personnel. The second program that suggests itself is that a calculated program should be undertaken to consciously stress, and teach the special military values and motivations early in a recruit's training. Because of their long cultural conditioning in a civil society generally unsympathetic to military characteristics, many newly recruited personnel may not be able to respond positively to the values of a military system even though they are, at bottom, sympathetic to them. A program in basic training which consciously recognized and openly prized the special characteristics of military

groups would do much to uncover these unarticulated responses.

A number of other specific programs could also be instituted which would aid, or at least, not suppress the special characteristics of military organization. Among these would be an increase in the number of grades with more appropriate relationships between grades; separate grades for technicians but not differential pay; an in-service college scholarship program which among other benefits would facilitate upward social mobility by properly preparing superior young enlisted personnel for commissioned status; and finally a pay program which would increase the standard-of-living allowances (quarters, rations, dislocation, etc.) to a realistic figure and then tie them by formula to a factor such as the national annual average industrial wage. This tie-in would allow for both increases in the cost-of-living, and also gains in the real income of the military man's civilian counterparts due to gains in the overall productivity of the economy. In this way military personnel would retain a fixed relationship in their standard of living with respect to the economy as a whole.

Other measures will, of course, emerge from the forthcoming Congressional hearings. It cannot be too strongly emphasized, however, that all such proposals should be carefully analyzed to be sure that they are not based on assumptions or principles which will eventually impair the functional efficiency of the military services. Military personnel require, not preferential consideration, but consideration based on their peculiar needs. Military service is not simply a job, but a whole way of life.

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